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INTRODUCTION

iINTRODUCTION
Only a ver^ few years ago the United States was
shocked into the realization that democracy, as an ideal and
a way of life, faced a threat. Today all over the world,
new governments are being established; an empire appears
to be in the first stages of dissolution; and a great new
power with a non-democratic political philosophy has come
into being. As a result the world has been divided into two
opposing camps. One the one hand the United States is
sponsoring democrecy in two countries and has given one
country its complete independence. On the other hand
Russia is seeking to spread its own political and social
doctrine, using the centuries-old imperialist principle of
expansion: complete centralization of power at home and
abroad, a calculating and tenacious policy of conquest.
Since the word "democracy" is neither fetish nor
magic charm, a better understanding of the ideal of
democracy will, perhaps, aid in its advancement. And this
seems right; for history indicates that the desire of
people for freedom and equality is an unquenchable Part of
human nature.
Democracy involves more than political systems and
processes; it involves economics, sociology, philosophy and
science as well. And since literature records the thoughts
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and actions of men, one may inquire into it and seek men's
indicated acts and thoughts. Emerson has been chosen because
he, better than any other man, represents the turning point
from the old America to the new. Rebelling agairs t the
older rationalism and idolatry of the state he spread his
gosoel of the infinite worth of the individual and the
equality of all men. fie heralded the new America and, in
fact, was the direct spiritual ancestor of some of the best
that is in modern literature as exemplified in the works of
/
Whitman, Dickinson, Sandburg, Benet, Frost and Steinbeck.
The general plan of this thesis will include a
brief historical view of democratic and non-democratic
elements in Hebrew, Greek, Roman and Engliai life; a
selection of passages from a number of Emerson's essays that
are nertinent to the subject of this thesis with special
V'
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consideration of his Politics; and a view of modern concepts
of democracy.
I shall not attempt to define democracy; rather,
I shall set down some of the ingredients pertaining to
democracy as I understand it. The history of democracy
reveals a constant and universal demand for liberty,
freedom and equality.
The degree of democratic realization has varied
from period to period and from society to society, from the
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fierce, primitive desire for complete liberty existing in
the Arab world today, for example, in which little
cooperative action is found, to the more or less integrated
and socially conscious Anglo-American world. Further,
democracy requires a clarified relationship between the
individual and the state; between individual and individual
who fully realize the place of democracy in men’s
consciousness. There is a recognition of the right of men
to life, liberty, and happiness consistent with the best
interests of mankind. The individual and the group need a
sense of security, of recognition of individual worth.
Opportunity for a self-realization should be present at all
times and in all places. Correlative to self-realization
is the realization of the mutual interests of individuals
and groups in a freely interacting society. In his long
historic struggle for freedom of thought, of speech, of
action, of press man has shown his desire and need for
democracy.
Democracy, as a political process, is not an end irl
itself. It is a means, only, for the attainment of a number
of things including liberty, equality, and freedom.
Democracy, in this sense, is the best method so far devised
by man to secure these ends.
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For the historical material of Chapter I, I have
relied heavily upon Fountainheads of Freedom by Irwin Edman
and A Short History of Democracy by Alan F. Hattersley.
j
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Chapter I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA

Chapter I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA
It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the
democratic idea and ideal as they appear in the essays of
Ralph Waldo Emerson. But democracy, as idea and ideal, has
a long history and many variations and developments.
Consequently,- it is advisable to set the Emersonian
conception of democracy against a background of antecedent
and subsequent democracies.
My plan is to treat of democratic ideals as they
exist in different periods and in different places, with
especial emphasis upon the Emersonian concepts. A dictionary
definition of democracy is an impossible task; for once it
has been confined to the rigid framework of definition, its
meaning will have changed. Ideas and objects are better
understood and appreciated in the light of their history; for
development and change act upon and react to previous events
and concepts.
The period from the time of the Hebrews to the
Levellers of mid- seventeenth century England will be reviewed
briefly. But, since England was the direct spiritual
ancestor of Colonial politics end sociology in America, the
period from the Levellers to Emerson will be treated more
full,y . The infant Republic of the united States had retained
i i
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According to this law, then, health instruction
in the schools should be in the form of factual teaching of
physiology and hygiene.
Importance of Study : Education in the health
field is an obvious necessity if one were to glance through
some statistics on disease and accident prevention and con-
trol. It can be said quite fairly that, by educating the
masses of people, the knowledge of facts and understanding of
principles are indispensable for the maintenance of health
and the prevention of diseases. It seems, therefore, that
the school is in the best position to provide this education
for the greatest number of people.
If health deserves the highest rank in the cardinal
principles of secondary education, it seems reasonable to be-
lieve that a great deal is being done in the schools to make
this principle really function. This study then will give
some idea of the value that the schools actually place on
health.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND WHY THIS PROBLEM WAS SELECTED:
This survey is to gain information relative to the in-
structional procedures involved in the program of health
education in the public high schools in Massachusetts. In
view of the variability in practice and the problems confront-
ing school authorities in many localities, it is desirable to
secure reports with respect to present procedures and suggest-
ions for the improvement of existing plans.
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3the universal. Plato denied the infinite variability of men
I and their equality.
Aristotle favored a moderate democracy in which a
few ruling experts were to be held in check by the many.
"The Many" included only a small middle class. In practice,
the Greek city-state was an enlargement of the family
concept. Each citizen was a member of the larger family;
the city-state. He was, in reality, a functional unit of
the larger body and was expected to take his turn in the
judicial and administrative affairs of the city-state family.
There was no dividing line between the citizen and the state.
But slaves and certain tradesmen were excluded from this
family circle. They were considered to be naturally
inferior and, therefore, unworthy to be free.
The basis of Roman written law was natural lav/
which, in turn, was a fixed manifestation of reason; for
reason was at the heart of nature. Law was supreme. The
stress was upon justice before impersonal law and upon the
consent of the governed. Universal equality of mankind
rested upon the foundation of correct reason; and
men formed a cosmopolitan society. These concepts were
i derived from the Greek Stoics and put into practice in the
Roman State. The Romans, however, drew a line between the

4citizen and the state. Roman citizenship was a matter of
political and civil rights.
The Hebrew, Greek and Roman practices considered
above may be placed in th^ir context as follows: Hebrew --
during the time of Samuel, Greek -- during the time of
Pericles, Roman -- during the time of Cicero.
Saint Paul considered faith in Christ as the basis
for equality and liberty. To enter into a universal
democracy, one had but to believe in Christ. Whereas the
Romans used national law to create a state, Paul relied upon
the spiritual brotherhood of men in Christ.
In the Middle Ages the monarch was considered to
be an agent of God, but only an agent. He had to rule
according to divinely instituted natural laws of justice.
The Church acted as check upon the king on the basis of the
idea of natural justice as recognizable by human reason in
all men. For this task the church had been appointed by God.
One of the first to fight for English liberty was
John Wyclif, who in 1365, opposed the pope’s attempt to
collect English tribute promised by King John 150 years
previously. Wyclif claimed that a nation possessed the same
rights as an individual; nor could a spiritual power be
sovereign over an independent country. The individual had
the right of his opinions on the basis of the Scriptures and
.. .
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5of reason. He could put his opinions into practice by
forming an association with other individuals. Tradition of
Church and State were unimportant; and their authority,
improper.
This political manoeuvre started movements in
Germany and in England that were to result in the Reformation.
Foreign authority had come up against the stone-wall of a
new and vigorous English Nationalism. The nation (king) and
the individual were just beginning to become vigorously
aware of themselves. Presently the individual would develop
a greater self-awareness and revolt against the national
head himself.
Later (1517-1520) Martin Luther evolved the concept
of the "priesthood of all believers' 1 . In this denial of the
need of a priest to act as mediator between God and man,
Luther proclaimed all men equal in the sight of God. By
faith men became free. The inalienable right of everyone of
God's children was spiritual freedom.
The Middle Ages gave way to the Renaissance and the
Reformation. The static and "stable" foundations upon which
men had built their world were washed away by the tide of
new discoveries and new ways of thinking.
In 1647 the Levellers agitated for human rights as
distinguished from property rights and inaugurated the
lit 'i:
' { :cr -ilru/.
-
:
<
" 0- nr
’
.t c il
a '• j .< t O '
.
.
. IX 3 r.
.
.
.
.
. I *
battle for English liberal democracy that was to continue
with varying degrees of success for the next two centuries.
The people had now entered into the English political arena,
at the instigation of the independent Levellers, the first
political democrats.
The "Agreement of the People" resulted from the
political debates that led up to the Puritan Revolution of
164v. The debates took place between the officers and the
representatives of the common soldier in uromwell's army.
Lach group recognized and admitted government by
representation. But the question was asked: was "the right
to choose the representative one that belongs only to the
wealthier citizens, those who pay the taxes, those who have
a ’local interest’ in the government; or is it a natural
right belonging to all men, a ’birthright’ of all
Englishmen? ¥
The following quotation is from the "Agreement of
the People" as drawn up> by the Levellers:
IV That the power of this, and all future
Representatives of this nation is inferior
only to theirs who choose them, and doth
extend, without the consent or concurrence
of any other person or persons, to the
enacting, altering, and repealing of laws;
to the erecting and abolishing of offices
and courts; to the appointing, removing,
and calling to account magistrates and
officers of all degrees; to the m aking of
war and peace; to the treating with foreign
..
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7states; and generally to whatsoever is not
expressly or impliedly reserved by the
represented themselves. Which are as
followeth:
1. That matters of religion, end the ways
of God’s worship, are not sfctall entrusted by
us to any human power, because therein we
cannot remit or exceed a tittle of what our
consciences dictate to be the mind of God,
without wilful sin; nevertheless the public
way of instructing the nation (so it be not
compulsive) is referred to their discretion.
2. That the matter of impressing and constraining
any of us to serve in the wars against our
freedom, and therefore we do not allow it in
our representatives; the rather because money
(the sinews of war) being always at their
disposal, they can never want numbers of men
apt enough to engage in any just cause.
3. That after the dissolution of this present
Parliament, no person be at any time questioned
for anything said or done in reference to the
late public differences, otherwise than in
execution of the judgments of the present
representatives, or House of Commons.
4. That to all laws made, or to be made,
every person may be bound alike, and that no
tenure, estate, charter, degree, birth or
place, do confer any exemption from the
ordinary course of legal proceedings,
whereunto others are subjected.
5. That as the laws ought to be equal, so
they must be good, and not evidently
destructive to the safety and well-being
of the people. These things we declare to
be our native rights, and therefore are
agreed and resolved to maintain them with
our utmost possibilities against all
opposition whatsoever, being compelled
thereunto not only by the example of our
ancestors, whose blood was often spent in
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8vain for the recovery of their freedoms,
suffering themselves, through fraudulent
accommodations, to be still deluded of the
fruit of their victories, but also by our
own woeful experience, who, having long
expected, and dearly earned, the
establishment of these certain rules of
government, are yet made to depend for
the settlement of our peace and freedom upon
him that intended our bondage and brought
a cruel war upon us. (1)
Significant is the fact that the people stood
before the government and dared to speak. This document
was "popular" rather than "baronial" like the Magna Carta,
signed by King John at Runnymede in 1215. While the latter
document had benefits that accrued to the people: trial by
jury; habeas corpus; purse strings of government in the
hands of the Common Council; yet it was primarily an
expression of nobility pitted against the royal head. The
"Agreement" was the voice and action of the people; it was
fundamental to English political democracy.
Many political tracts were written during the
English Civil War period. The general theme was liberal
democracy. Even the conservative Hobbes felt the stir of
individualism, and although he preached the absolute
sovereignty of government he claimed that sovereignty only
upon the basis of protection of individual interests and
1. Edman, Fountainheads of Freedom, 285-7
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upon law and order. A "monstrous power, monstrously
absolute" was the only force capable of preventing men from
preying upon each other. Order required loyalty to this
central power. Interest in the common man was being
publically proclaimed. It had become important to stand for
the individual.
But the Levellers worked upon the principle of
free assent in religion and consent of the governed in
government. Religiously, they opposed a national church of
appointed priests. Religious as v/ell as political leaders
were to be chosen by popular vote. Every man in England, big
or little, had a life to live. No government that forbade
him a voice had any hold upon him. Farliement was merely
the instrument of the people called into being by the
popular voice. Government was not set up to perpetuate and
and protect property rights above persons. Vested interests
were not consonant with the present age which had fought to
stamp out "exorbitances, molestations and arbitrary power. "(2)
The Levellers argued for a written constitution;
but monarchy was soon to return to England and the Levellers
to be ousted politically, let they had forwarded the
concept of natural rights as inalienable and "rights of
2. Ibid., 64
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individuals as guaranteed against all authority, even that of
their own representatives.
"
John Locke had caught something of the spirit of
rhe Levellers. And in 1689 he wrote two papers that were to
have a significant influence upon democratic tradition:
Letter of Toleration ; the two Treatises on Civil Government .
In general, Locke assumed a natural state in which
peace, mutual assistance and preservation and natural
justice acted as regulating factors. This state preceded
all government and all society, The rights and duties
pertaining to this state were inherent;, intrinsic and
inalienable. The chief and most characteristic of the
inalienable rights was the right of private property. "But
even private property was to him a personal right and it was
with the rights of persons and individuals that Locke was
chiefly concerned." ^ocke was the first philosopher to
treat government as an agency to insure to the people "life,
liberty and. the pursuit of happiness"; the first to insist
upon these rights and on the duties that they implied.
Although he discarded the concept of innate ideas, he
heartily endorsed the concept of the self-evident character
of personal rights. (5)
3. Ibid., 70
.•)
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Empirically, rights seem to he generated by
the structure of a society and duties seem to
be those obligations custom breeds or law can
enforce. Locke thought differently and it has
become part of the American tradition to think
differently. Ancient justice (Roman) conceived
of law in terms of a common or public good,
but Locke’s liberal democratic doctrine
stresses universal parity of private rights,
of individuals who provisionally yield their
independence to society and to government only
that their independence and individuality
may be guarded. (4)
The notions of individual rights as inherent and
individuality expressed in terms of personal and private
liberties were fundamental concents of both of Locke’s
Treatises on Civil Government . His distrust of too much
government found echoes in American democracy, notably
in Jefferson.
Locke was too far away from the Industrial
Revolution of the 19th century to see the social significance
of property. Theories of inalienable rights of property
and the notion of free enterprise were useful to the
dominant economic interests and manufacturers as against
the greater number of individuals with lesser power but with
equal rights.
Locke exalted the integrity of the individual and
distrusted regimentation and bureaucracy. Government was
4 Ibid., 71
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mrather an instrument created by the "consent of the governed,
of each of the governed." Government was an agent of society
and revolution and overthrow of government was justified
when that government be^trayed that society. But society
was orimarily a collection of individuals. And government
and society were "agents of private interests -- of life,
liberty and estate. 11 Majority rule was the final authority;
therefore, limits had to be set upon executive power.
Locke’s contribution to the Whig and Liberal
movement in England was great:
Government by consent, responsibility of the
governing power toward the governed, government
as furthering liberty, the paramount and
ultimate sanctions of individuals. (5)
Rousseau belonged to the period of the
Enlightenment and Revolution. He emphasized man’s
independence, privacy and love of moral solitude on the one
hand, and men’s love for living together in an organic
society on the other. Inconsistency did not seem to bother
Jean Jacques Rousseau at all. Consistent or not, he exerted
a tremendous influence upon Europe and the United States
that was to be. His primary doctrine was the "humsn being’s
pristine individuality." He regarded individuality as
5 Ibid., 74
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sacred; for to him the voice of the majority was not merely
the voice of justice; it was the voice of God, (6)
Rousseau pictured the primitive state of man as
one of full happiness: no clothes, no restrictions on
freedom, no friends needed. Man lived on the generous
bounty of nature.
But the modern world converted this naturally
good man into a corrupt, miserable creature by its
"civilizing influence. " Innocence and happiness were lost
in the sensuality and pernicious learning of civilization.
A return to the simple life was the only solution. As a
step in that direction Rousseau attacked the authority of
the king and the church.
He proposed to create a new association in which
the common will of the people was brought to bear upon any
attacking force. Each person was to unite himself with the
group and still obey himself. But man had arrived at a
point where return to the original primitive state was
impossible. "The human race would perish unless it changed
its manner of existence." But rearward movement was
impossible. T'he new state would have a general will, a
personality. And a man would be an individual because he was
6. Ibid., 78
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a citizen of the body politic. The ideal man then became
the ideal citizen. Only in society could men become free.
There would be fellowship in a common unitary society. (7)
To the democratic stream, Rousseau contributed
brotherly enterprise, fellowship, association, privacy,
simplicity, solitude.
The French Revolution appeared to many as the
liberation of men from authority and tyranny. To others
it meant the end of order and tradition and security.
Among the former were Coleridge, the early Wordsworth,
Shelley and Godwin all of whom felt that, at last, the
"perfectibility of the individual could be achieved in a
free society . " (8)
Godwin rested his hope upon the gradual educative
process rather than upon revolution. Perfection was to be
achieved through reason. Social institutions v/ere the
hindrances upon the mind and spirit of man. Government was
needed only where reason and justice were wanting. But a
free and educated nature expressed reason and justice
naturally. There was no need for government.
7. Ibid., 81
8. Ibid., 91
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Godwin's philosophic anarchism based its hopes upon
the idea that each man is potentially a wise man. Reason
and the abstract universal benevolence would impel men to
see all men as neighbors, to treat all men as equals. (9)
Shelley believed that men were naturally good,
innocent and kind; that institutions were destructive to
their native kindness. Love and beauty, these two would
transform the world. Beauty awakened love; and reason
directed it.
He looked upon man as capable of perfection.
But perfection was possible only in a perfect society.
Tyranny and superstition had to be removed for these were
destructive to love and beauty. Therefore, society’s
foundations had to be shaken hard enough for the
annihilation of the superstructure of form and maxim. And
in its stead a new culture raised. Shelley compared the
present society to his ideal society. In much the same
manner, Emerson and Thoreau caught a glimpse of a new, great
society in transcendental moments and compared the imperfect
existing world with their vision. But they had set up a
beacon for themselves. (10)
9. Ibid., 94
10. Ibid., 96
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It was true that the American democratic idea had
its roots in the pre-American past: the revolutions in
England and the pioneers of the French Revolution; the
concept of natural rights, the innerent dignity of the
individual; society as modeled after the eternal moral
pattern of reason and justice. The Declaration of
Independence and the Bill of Rights owed much to Locke,
Rousseau and Montesquieu to name only a few. Consent of the
governed, sovereignty of the people, majority rule, were old
concepts when the American Republic came into being.
Yet the ideas of liberty and equality, in time,
took on an American flavor. The vast unknown continent and
the comparative absence of established castes, economic and
religious, were significant. Individuality in the pioneer
West became more than a word; it became a religion.
Individual initiative counted more than position in a
hierarchy. Bach pioneer set individual liberty high in the
moral order. Emerson transformed the pioneer’s initiative
and liberty into a transcendental self-reliance. xo the
pioneer they were conditions of survival. xhey had to believ
5
in themselves indvidually and in all men. A vision was
created in which the conditions of American pioneer liberty
might be extended to all men -- given similar conditions .( 11)
11. Ibid., 134
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But the idea of the equality of all citizens and
the ideal of the sacred sovereignty of the people came not
with the constitution but with the era of Jefferson and
Jackson.
Jefferson rested his case upon majority rule in an
agrarian society. Natural justice worked on the side of the
majority provided that the people’s discernment was sharpened
by education. So Jefferson spent a portion of his life in
planning an educational system for the state of Virginia. ( 12)
"Jacksonian democracy came out of the West." This
was the ideal of the common man and of leaders who were of
the people. A classless society existed in the Vi/est; and
self-reliance was everything — tradition, nothing. With
Jackson the electoral college no longer elected the
President. Popular presidential elections came in. The
population was The People.
Liberty came in with the American Revolution; civil
equality, with Jefferson; and the will of the People, with
Jackson.
Among American men of letters, Emerson, Thoreau,
and Whitman sponsored individualism in America. All men
were created free and equal; in all men preeminently burned
12. Ibid., 142
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a divine spark; contemporary institutions stifled these
attributes. Emerson and Thoreau frequently criticized
American political institutions as destructive to personality
and longed for individualistic democracy. Yet, while
Emerson looked with stern disfavor upon institutions, he
favored progressive improvement of government on the basis
of the greatest good to the greatest number. He knew that
his ideal government would not come overnight and hoped by
the educative process to lead men to a gradual improvement
of society. As I shall indicate in the last chapter of this
thesis, Emerson was in full accord with modern liberal
thinking.
Ranging far afield in search of ideas, Emerson
combined non-American concepts with the practical
individualism of American life and emerged with an
individualized philosophy. His fundamental faith was not
in democratic government but in character -- in the
"infinitude of the individual. " Faith in character
suggested the equal divinity of all men, a divinity that
would become evident if individuality were permitted to
flower. He was a persistent and bitter critic of
institutions and regimentation; for they hindered the
flowering of individuality.
.,
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The individual was not a ballot or a cog in a
potential machine or even a member of a state. He was
primarily a soul. The concept of the "intrinsic dignity
and intrinsic resources and possibilities" (13) of character,
Emerson shared with the German Romsntic philosophers and
with the English Romantic poets Coleridge, Shelley and
Wordsworth. The Romanticists had revolted against the
"mathematical clarities and deadening materialism of the
Enlightenment." They exalted the ego, the impulse, the
creative character of the self. The individual was born
again. (14)
Until about 1820, the influence of Locke and
Bentham had been almost complete: "all ^nnate ideas were
denied and morality was based on custom and utility." Most
of the English Unitarians belonged to this school.
Materialists
,
they believed in mechanical revelation.
However, a new tide of idealistic philosophy appeared and
was made effective in the German Romantic philosophy and in
the English Transcendentalism.
Coleridge introduced German idealism into England.
Emerson took his inspiration in part from there. The hold
13. Ibid., 145
14. Ibid., 146
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of Locke and Bentham weakened. Coleridge argued for the
innateness of ideas and for a faculty which transcended both
sense and understanding. Morality became identical with
religion; they had their source in intuition. Reason -- o^e
transcendent faculty — was the immediate seeing of
supersensible things. Coleridge objected to the term
"faculty" as applied to reason; for reason was not to be
considered as the personal property of any human mind. Men
did not possess it but shared in it. Reason was a spark of
Universal Reason as it entered the human mind. All
intelligent beings shared in it; and it was identical in
them all. Emerson used this concept in explanation of the
Oversoul.
t
Wordsworth gave to Emerson the idea that nature was
alive with the Universal Spirit; it embodied the Universal
Reason and its outward expression was law and order. German
thinkers confirmed these ideas. Herder identified religion
and intuition. Genius, expressed in the great man,
constituted the world’s chief progressive force and the
source of all rightful activity.
All of the German philosophers of this movement
ardently preached individuality. Each soul was a new
expression of Universal Reason. Since the "real source of
truth is intuition, we must look inwardly, rely on reason as
..
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it speaks to us; and not outwardly, to history end social
customs." (15)
Emerson did not hold with the concept that the
state rested upon the fact of Natural Order; end its lav/s,
upon a Natural Law. The state was something new in the
nature of things, something new under the sun. Since it
grew out of men’s actions and was man’s answer to the
solution of particular problems, the state was not superior
to the citizen. The state was cr ated for the citizen not
the citizen for the state for it was a much a result of
human action as was a written document. It was alterable and
fluid, without root or center; for any strong will might
become, for a time, the motivating and guiding power of the
state. Cromwell was such a strong will; Plato was another. (Ip)
15. Cooke, Emerson
,
53
16. "Politics", Essays
,
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Chapter II
THE INDIVIDUAL AND .SOCIETY

Chapter II
THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY
Running through his essays like a bright
connecting thread, is Emerson's individual philosophy,
described by F. I. Carpenter as pragmatic mysticism. (17)
Mr. Carpenter suggests that "pragmatic mysticism is
essentially the American philosophy" or "the American Dream"
since a mystical belief in the possibility of a good life in
America led to its founding and continued to motivate
Americans from the Declaration of Independence, written by
an idealist and based upon an act of faith, to William James
and John Dewey.
Up to the time of James and Dewey no attempt at
philosophic systematization had been attempted. Emerson
himself disclaimed the title of "philosopher" when he
announced that he was too young yet by some ages to compile
a code and declared his metaphysics to be to the end of use,
only. He recognized that the transitional and revolutionary
character of the times in which he lived did not favor
systems, all of which were apt to freeze into grotesque
patterns.
17 Carpenter, Introduction in Emerson, XXIII
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It willbe helpful to remember that Emerson's
philosophy arose out of his own modified view of the
Christian religion. A recognition of the concepts of
emanation and of evolution i re indispensable to a proper
understanding of Emerson's philosophy. Emerson took up the
old Plotinian emanation theory, modified by later mystics
tnd by the "inner light" concept of the Quakers. God was
thought of as "a reservoir of spiritual energy. " Religion
was "the emanation of this energy from its divine source,
and its influx into the individual life, enriched and
illuminated that life. " Thus it is evident that Emerson
should emphasize the spirit rather than the letter of the
religious law; personal experience rather than formal
tradition; and education rather than prohibitions.
As a philosopher, Emerson was an idealist but
never one who denied the reality of matter. Reality lay
in the fact of experience which was of two types: mystical
and sensory. There were two kinds of fact: physical and
spiritual. Life itself was ccmoosed of sensations and states
of mind which were unified by man's consciousness. The soul
existed independent of and prior to organism and constituted
the Me; Nature, which was all else, was the Not-Me. This
view of the universe, Emerson believed to be superior to that
of the materialist
.‘1
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The materialist insists on facts, on history,
on the force of circumstances and the animal
wants of man; the idealist on the power of
Thought and Will, on inspiration, on miracle,
on individual culture. ( 18
)
While both materialism and idealism were natural
- modes of thinking, the idealist’s way of thinking was in
higher nature. The idealist conceded the impressions of
the senses and their coherence. But did the senses report
the whole story? Were facts as reported by the senses the
only facts of the world? Emerson believed that there were
spiritual facts which were not discerned by the unaided
senses.
The soul perceived and revealed the truth in much
the same way that we know when we are awake. It was not the
supersensitive of religious experience of the religious
enthusiasts that yielded mystical experience, it was rather
the simple, universal experience of every common man with
nature which by its discipline educated man through his
experience, served as the bridge between soul and world.
Soul and nature were necessary to each other and could not
exist separately. The soul's function was to recognize the
relationship between particular facts and events in nature
18 Emerson, "Man the Reformer" in Essays
,
229,230

and seek a unitary view of reality.
In addition to viewing nature as interrelation,
Emerson saw nature as process.
Nature, in its ministry to man, is not only
the material, but is also the process and
the result. All the D8rts incessantly work
into each other’s hands for the profit of
man. The wind sows the seeds; ...the plant
feeds the animal; and thus the endless
circulations of the diyine clarity nourish
man. (19)
Cities, schools, churches and systems of
government were but manifestations of ideas that have
changed throughout the history of man.
There are no fixtures in nature. The
universe is fluid and volatile. Permanence
is but a v/ord of degrees. Our globe as
seen by God is a transparent lav/, not a
mass of facts. The law dissolves the
fact and holds it fluid
Every ultimate fact is only the first of
a new series. Every general law only a
particular fact of some more general law
presently to dissolve itself. There is
no outside, no inclosing wall, no
circumference to us. The man finishes
his story, — how good! how final I how
it puts a new face on all things! He fills
the sky. Lol on the other side rises also
a man and draws a circle around the circle
we had just pronounced the outline of the
sphere. (20)
19. Emerson, "Nature" in Essays
,
13
20. Emerson, "Circles" in Essays, 302
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By intuition the universe was knowable. The
infinite soul of man was capable of perceiving, intuitively,
the infinite world of God. Intuition to Emerson meant that
God was immediate in the philosophic sense: direct union of
man’s soul to the soul of God. And since all men were
capable of intuition, they were equals. On the basis of
intuition a man knew his tasks and privileges, and planned
his actions without regard to society.
Speak what you think now in hard words and
tomorrow speak what tomorrow things in hard
words again, though it contradict everything
you said today. A foolish consistency is'
the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and divines. (21)
This concept was in harmony with Emerson’s idea of
universe as process. Not only was nature in process of
change but man's understanding of nature changed as well.
A change in man required a change in his actions and in his
words. Emerson was thinking of consistency to a particular
stage in a man’ s development rather than consistency to
previous, outmoded ideas.
Democracy as a manifestation of an idea would then
be not static but dynamic. Democracy today, to be consistent
would conform to the economic, political and philosophical
21. Emerson, "Self-Reliance" in Essay s, 57
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ideas of today, A modern democracy that conformed to.
abandoned ideas of a previous century would be foolishly
consistent
.
Moral Law stood at the center of nature; and every
natural process was one facet merely of the greater moral
structure. Moral Law applied at all points of action and
of thought. Nature was completely moral. Nature was to
Emerson "a discipline of the understanding in intellectual
truths.
"
Our dealing with sensible objects is a
constant exercise in the necessary lessons
of difference, of likeness, of order, of
being and seeming, of progressive
arrangement; of ascent from particular to
general; of combination to one end of
manifold forces. (22)
But nature had another aspect: it was intellect
precipitated.
In the divine order, intellect is primary;
nature secondary; it is the memory of the
mind. That which once existed in intellect
as pure law, has now taken body as Nature. (25)
Consequently nature, our concept of it, represented
a standard of human progress. A nature conceived as poor anc
22. Emerson, "Discipline" in Essays
,
36. .
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23. hunerson, "The Method of Nature" in Essays
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sordid mirrored a like intellectual state of man. A divine
nature showed man as divine and infinite. And until man saw
the universe as divine, he was only potentially divine. The
individual needed to raise himself to a high spiritual level
before he "became worthy uf conducting the affairs of the
state. The people in their existing condition were not
fitted for self-government.
Emerson was a partial democrat, a democrat in the
process of becoming. His requirements were too restricted
and unrealistic. Hot everyone is intuitively endowed.
Emerson’ s democracy did not square with the nature of the
people about him. He looked for a state in which the
majority of the people were great men. This was "aristo-
cratic n democracy.
Emerson specified the type of individual needed to
create the ideal state. One had to have genius. And genius
consisted in complete belief that one’s own thoughts v^ere
true not only for the thinker but for all men. How often
have the works of genius ecnoed one’s own rejected thoughts?
We but half express ourselves, and are
ashamed of that divine idea which each
of us represents. it may be safely
trusted as proportionate and of good
issues, so it be faithfully imparted,
but God will not have his work made
manifest by cowards. (24)
24. op. cit., 46, 47
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God had selected a place in the universe for each
individual. To accept this place one required a_full, firm
self trust; for that position might be small or great. No
use to have planned a career. Intuition guided each person
to his proper level. This was Emerson’s "transcendent
destiny." He visualized those who accepted their destiny
as members of a brave army advancing, under the aegis of the
Creator, upon "Chaos and the Dark," and thus flooding the
newly won ground with the light of knowledge.
How was one to know whether his nature and his
actions were good? Emerson perceived intuitively that one
moral law activated everyone to moral action: a moral
stimulus evoking a moral reaction.
There is one mind common to all individual
men. Every man is an inlet to the same and
to all of the same. He that is once admitted
to the right of reason is made a freeman of
the whole estate. What Plato thought, he may
think; what a saint has felt, he may feel;
what at any time has befallen any man, he
can understand. Who hath access to this
universal mind is a party to allfthat is or
can be, for this is the only and sovereign
agent
...... Of the works of this mind history is the
record. Its genius is illustrated by the entire
series of days. Man is explicable by nothing
less than all his history. Without hurry,
without rest, the human spirit goes forth from
the beginning to embody every faculty, every
thought, every emotion which belongs to it,
in appropriate events. But the thought is
.• V -
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always prior to the fact; all the facts of
history preexist in the mind as laws. Each
law in turn is made by circumstances predominant,
and the limits of nature give power to but one
at a time. A man is the whole encyclopedia of
facts. The creation of a thousand forests is
in one acorn, and Egypt, Greece, Rome, Gaul,
Britain, America, lie folded already in the
first man. Epoch after Epoch, camp, kingdom,
empire, republic, democracy, are merely the
application of his manifold spirit in a manifold
world. (25)
Emerson seemed to believe that democracy was
inevitable, for it was the culmination of the preordained
way of life.
What was the rationale of self-trust? Emerson
always looked for a universal factor to rely upon.
The inquiry leads us to that source, at one the
essence of genius, of virtue, of life, which we
call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote this
primary wisdom as Intuition, whilst all later
teachings are intuitions. ... First we share
the life by which things exist and afterwards
see them as appearances in nature and forget
that we have shared their cause. Here are the
foundations of action and of thought. ... When
we discern justice, when we discern truth, we
do nothing of ourselves, but allow a passage
to its beams. (26)
Emerson's democracy, then, did not imply complete
freedom. There was reliance upon something primary, there
25. Emerson, ’’History" in Essays
, 3, 4
26. Op. cit., 64
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were limitations. It could not fall under the criticism of
George Santayana for example.
The liberty they (parties end nations beyond
the pale of English liberty) want is absolute
liberty, a desire which is quite primitive.
It may be identified with the love of life
which animates all' creation, or with the
pursuit of happiness which all men would be
engaged in if they were rational. Indeed,
it might even be identified with the first
law of motion, that alljbodies, if left free,
persevere in that state of rest, or of motion
in a straight line, in which they happen to
find themselves. (27)
Important to a functional democracy was Emerson’s
concept of the relationship between man and the over-all
or Universal Intelligence. Traditions or dicta or texts
were no longer sacred. Worship of the past as the past
was condemned. Emerson turned his back upon the past and
looked ahead. Man was to live in the present with his eyes
turned to the future and his mind attuned to the Supreme
Intelligence. This wras man fulfilled, completely himself,
free. Self-reliance was really God-reliance.
Emersonian self-reliance could well shake modern
society off its foundations.
27. Santayana, Character and Opinion in the United States,
214. 215
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It is easy to see that a greater self-reliance must
work a revolution in all the offices and relations
of men; in their religion; in their education;
in their pursuits; their modes of living; their
associations; in their property; in their
speculative views. (28;
But one can hardly expect self-reliance to set in
too great a degree. There seems to he an inert drag in the
cultural field similar to that in the physical world. In
the cultural world, physical inertia becomes cultural lag.
xet to meet demands of a changing world democracy will
perhaps need to set is back to the past, its feet in the
present, its face to the future.
As a unit of the larger social body, the Emersonian
man was affiliated with other men by spiritual bonds.
Thought answered to thought in obedience of the "great
instincts. 11
I am certified of a common nature, and other
souls, these separated selves, draw me as
nothing else can. They stir in me the new
emotions we call passipns; of love, hatred,
fear In all conversations between
two persons tacit reference is made, as to
a third party, to a common nature. The third
party or common nature is not social; it is
impersonal; it is God. And so in groups
where debate is earnest, and especially on
high questions, the company become aware
that the bought rises to an equal level
28, Emerson, op. cit., 77
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in all bosoms, that all have a spiritual
property in what was said, as well as the
sayer. (29)
This "wisdom of humanity" was the common property
of all men of all ages. Great men accented it thankfully
without trying to name it or claim it. unity of thought
and duty and power possessed men in society. As a result
a greater wisdom was achieved. Men were thus made man; and
individuals, into self governing bodies.
But what of the majority of the people in the
United States?
Leave this hypocritical prating about the
masses. Masses are rude, lame, unmade,
pernicious in their demands and influence,
and need not be flattered but to be schooled.
I do not wish to concede anything to them,
but to tame, drill, divide and break them up,
and draw individuals out of them.
...... I do not wish any mass at all, but
honest men only, lovely, sweet, accomplished
women only, and no shovel-handed, narrow-
brained, gin-drinking million stockingers or
lazzaroni at all
To say then, the majority are wicked, means
no malice, no bad heart in the observer, but
simply that the majority are unripe, and have
not yet come to themselves, do not yet know
their opinion. (30)
29. Emerson, "Oversoul" in Essays
,
276, 277
• Emerson, "Considerations by the Way" in Conduct of Life,
249, 252
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Emerson did. not attempt to define democracy, but
he did write about it as follows:
The root and seed of democracy is the doctrine.
Judge for yourself. Reverence thyself. It is
the inevitable effect of the doctrine, where it
has any effect ( which is rare ), to insulate
the partisan, to make each man a state. At the
same time it replaces the dead with a living
check in a true, delicate reverence for superior,
congenial minds . How is the King greater than I
if he is not more just?
Democracy, Freedom, has its roots in the sacred
truth that ever man hath in him the divine
Reason, or that, though few men since the
creation of the world live according to the
dictates of Reason, yet all men are created
capable of so doing. That is the equality
and the only equality of all men. To this
truth we look when we say. Reverence thyself;
be true to thyself. (31)
When I speak of the democratic element, I do
not mean that ill thing, vain and loud, which
writes lying newspapers, spouts at caucuses, and
sells its lies for gold; but that spirit of
love for the general good whose name this
assumes. There is nothing of the true democratic
element in what is call Democracy; it must fall,
being wholly commercial. (I beg I may not be
understood to praise anything which the soul
does not honor, however grateful may be names
to your ear and your pocket.) (32)
The "infinitude of the private man" was the center
of Emerson's democratic concept. The individual was the
31. Emerson, Journals III
, 369, 390
32. Ibid., VII, 221
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equal of all other individuals for this reason alone. But
the infinitude of man was in the future. And since this
equality was only potential, it would appear that Emerson did
not look upon his fellowman, any fellow man, as equal to
himself in his own democratic society. Ir^eneral, the
individual's accord with society was only partially
accomplished. The masses, the majority, were unworthy .
Shall ’ e judge the country by the majority or
by the minority? Certamly by the minority.
The masses are animal, in state of pupilage,
nearer the chimpanzee. (33)
Emerson could not go the full way with his famous
contemporary, George Bancroft, who said:
There is a spirit in men: not in the privileged
few; not in those of u s who by the favor of
Providence have been nursed in public schools:
it is in man; it i s an attribute of the race.
If reason is a universal faculty, the universal
decision is the nearest criterion of truth.
The common mind winnows opinions: it is the sieve
which separates error from certainty. (34)
But Emerson had a remedy. Democracy had as its
supreme interest "the culture of men, the nurture of spirits. '
The ^ate was a society of free men whose divine endowment:
appeared only when they were unfettered. In the true state,
the wise man is the state.
33. Perry, The heart of Emerson's Journal
,
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Chapter III
THE POLITICAL DEMOCRACY OF EMERSON

Chapter III
TEE POLITICAL DEMOCRACY OF EMERSON
In 1844 Emerson wrote two masterful pieces which
dealt with the subject of politics. One was originally a
lecture read before the Mercantile Library Association of
Boston on February seventh and published in essay form in
April. He called it "The Young American." The other was
his "Politics", based upon his Boston lecture series of
1839-40 on "The Present Age". Tbis lecture, he revised and
published in essay form in 1844.
In the former piece, Emerson emphasized the
difference between his ideal of democracy and the means of
achieving it. he placed love end goodness at the fuuAidation
of all human activity; and these were inevitable in the course
of things. Stated as a law, it read, "You shall have
everything as a member, nothing to yourself. " This necessity
of belongingness united the ultimate, perfect man, through
the medium of the Universal Mind, with all other men and
impelled them to act without the need for governmental
prohibitions and exhortations. Emerson hailed the new
movements in government and in daily living as a good sign.
..
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All this "beneficent socialism is a friendly-
omen, and the swelling cry of voices for the
education of the people indicates that
Government has other offices than those of
banker and executioner. Witness the new
movements in the civilized world, the
Communism of France, Germany, and Switzerland;
the Trades* Unions, the English League against
the Corn Laws.... (35)
Emerson approved the over-all intent of these
movements because he believed that they were founded in
love and aimed at ''securing to all|their members an equal
and thorough education. " The value of the movements
consisted not in what they had done but in what they
foreshadowed, namely, a revolution in in: ent and in basic
philosophy: to do good and to build upon the principle of
love as motivation. Contemporary governmental and social
action recommended conventual and conservative behavior
and systems, all to the purpose of preserving the status quo
whether good or bad. But those who attacked the status quo,
capitalism proposed to make the poor man, himself, a
capitalist. Obviously this was not a real remedy. The basic
philosophy needed reorganization.
35. Emerson, "The Young American" in Nature, Addresses and
Lectures, 380
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If only the men are employed in conspiring
with the designs of the Spirit who led us
hither and is leading us still, we shall
quickly enough advance out of hearing of
others! censures, out of all regrets of
our own, into a new and more excellent
social state than history has recorded. (36)
In the opening paragraph of his essay on politics,
Emerson indicated that a state at any particular moment was
nothing more than the cross section of a process in which law
and usages had been combined to meet particular cases. A
state was not, as some people imagine, a rigid institution
into which people had perforce to fit themselves; it was
rather a changing movement which followed the lead of men of
character. In other words, politics "rest on necessary
foundations, and cannot be treated with levity.'' (37) For
was not the wise man he who fitted in perfectly with nature
and the Universal Mind? Politics was tied up to the
Universal Mind through the medium of the wise man; and the
code or the written laws of men were expedients to be used
until a further movement in the state-process should require
more appropriate laws. The code did not make the state or
modify policy and modes of life. Therefore, such processes
as commerce and religion were not to be voted in or out; they
grew out of the character of the citizenry.
s
36. Ibid., 395
37. "Politics" in Essays, 199
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Foolish legislation is a rope of sand which
perishes in the twisting, ...the State must
follow and not lead the character and progress
of the citizen; the strongest usurper is quickly
got rid of; and they only who build on Ideas,
build for eternity; and that form of government
which prevails is the expression what cultivation
exists in the population which permits it. The
law is only a memorandum. (38)
Emerson thought that the essence of contemporary
political theory was the protection of persons and oroperty.
Since persons were identical in nature, all had equal rights
and a democratic system followed as naturally as the ocean’s
tides follow the influence of the moon. But since property
did not y LeLd as readily as did persons to discernible
principles, it was difficult to set it into the proper
pattern; in viewing the present pattern human society sensed
instinctively that the entire system of property rights was
not valid and was therefore destructive to human character.
The problem of the true place of property in society
was for Emerson a difficult one to decide; and if he had
hoped thet true culture would eventually take the place of
foolish legislation, that love would replace destructive
competition, it was to the law of Compensation which merged
with the doctrine of Emersonian "fate” that he turned. He
believed, as firmly as anyone in history ever did, in the
immutability and universality of a lawT which manifested
38. Ibid., 200
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itself in what he called polarity or action and reaction.
He found many examples in nature: heat and cold, the ebb and
flow of water, systole and diastole of the pulsating heart,
every evil had its good.
This law writes the laws of cities and nations.
It is in vain to build or plot or combine
against it. Things refuse to be mismanaged
long. ’Res nolunt diu male administrari.
’
Though no checks to a new evil appear, the
checks exist, end will appear. If the
government is cruel, the governor's life is
not safe. If you tax too high, the revenue
will yield nothing. If you make criminal
code sanguinary, juries will not convict.
If the law is too mild, private vengeance
comes in. If the government is a terrific
democracy, the pressure is resisted by an
overcharge of energy in the citizen, and life
glows with a fiercer flame. The true life
and satisfactions of man seem to elude the
utmost rigors or felicities of conditions
and to establish themselves with great
indifferency under all varieties of
circumstances. Under all governments the
influence of character remains the same, --
in Turkey and in New England alike. Under
the primeval despots of Egypt, history
honestly confesses that man must have been
as free as culture could make him. (39)
This concept was fundamental in Emerson's
philosophy. He urged that men look for and recognize the
stream of law, that they go along with its tide. "Our power
consists not in abolishing or creating, but in transference
merely . " (40)
39. Emerson, "Compensation" in Essays
,
100
40. Emex-son, "Power" in Conduct of Life, 546
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Emerson's conviction of the efficacy of the law of
Compensation was, perhaps, a major factor in his optimism
and high hopes for society. His hopes could hardly have
been so high had he had to depend upon the earnest vigilance
of elected magistrates to defend society and regulate its
affairs with justice. Nor could he look to society itself
with any glowing expectation, for society consisted largely,
"of young and foolish persons" and the majority of the
citizens of a state were ignorant and deceivable. It was
good, it was in the nature of things, the t men should look
to the formidable natural defenses of society; for every
item in society and in the rest of nature would have its
just influence. Referring to the essential functions of
government with respect to the protection of persons and
property, Emerson held that "Things have their laws, as well
as men; and things refuse to be trifled with. Property will
be protected". Each atom in the universe required its just
sway and its influence emanated from it as surely and as
steadily as did the gravitational force from matter. Persons
and property required "their proper force, -- if not overtly,
then covertly. 11 Should a law declare that property owners
have no power, nevertheless, a higher law would dictate that
property write every law respecting property. The term
"property" in this context should not be interpreted to mean
-'
.
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"great estates," for Emerson spoke of the totality of property
Sometimes the poor outvoted the rich; hut it was their
accumulated property that exerted the greater influence.
The concept that a higher law wrote the statutes
for each object, whether it was property or persons, remains
important in the consideration of Emerson’s thinking on
politics and democracy. Emerson's "higher law" was at t he
center of all nature and governed all things through all of
the mistaken and fumbling attempts at lawmaking by imperfect
human legislators. Only when man shall have achieved full
harmony with the center (which was moral in character) could
he push aside the mysterious curtain that stood between
himself and perfect understanding. At such a time the
"infinitude of the private man" will have been achieved and
the common unity of all men with the moral center will have
been accomplished.
If Emerson's position on the question of democracy
seemed uncertain and vacillating, it may be due to the fact
that he looked upon the complexity of nature as a process,
and democracy was undergoing a historic change in form. As a
result he saw not merely one democracy but many democracies,
one democracy growing out of its predecessor. There was a
continual adjustment and readjustment upon the basis of the
law of Compensation. Democracy was not an end but a means
.•
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only. To Emerson the end was complete understanding of
nature in which question and answer would be one and in which
the wise man functioned in accordance with and in harmony
with nature’s laws. Democracy was to him a means only,
without the distorting aura of fetish and magic charm.
Emerson would- never have consented to a standardized
democracy, one which had been lifted out of the context of
its environment and put into a rigid frame to be worshipped.
He knew that standardization resisted invigorating and
necessary change, that standardization meant death. A modern
English historian has commented oon the destructive effects
of standardization. He calls it "the idolization of
techniques" and quotes from Gerald Heard’s The Source of
Civilization as follows:
"Life starts in the sea. There it attains to
an extraordinary efficiency. The fishes give
rise to types which are so successful (such,
for instance, as the sharks) that they have lasted
and unchanged until today. The path of
ascending evolution did not, however, lie in
this direction A creature which has become
perfectly adapted to its environment, an
animal whose whole capacity and vital force
is concentrated and expended in succeeding
here and now, has nothing left over with which
to respond to any radical change. ...In the end
it can therefore beat all competitors in the
special field; but equally, on the other hand,
should the field change, it must become extinct,
.... They were committed, could not readjust, and
so they vanished. 11 (41)
41. Toynbee, A Study of History
,
327
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Another analogue cited was the fight between David
and Goliath. The latter had achieved nianj victories "in his
panoply of casque and corselet and target and greaves." He
could conceive of no other type of armament; for what he
wears had in the past given him invincibility. He could
visualize an Israelite foe only in comparable armor and
thought such a foe foolhardy to match strength with him.
But David used his own weapon better adapted for the new
situation.
Down through the entire history of military
warfare the standardized technique that was idolized fell
before a more efficient and newer technique. The Homeric
hoplite or the individual hero succumbed to the new,
effective Spartan phalanx which in turn fell before the
Athenian peltasts. The peltast was outmoded by Alexander’s
Macedonian order of battle; and the Roman Legion shattered
the Macedonian order of battle. The triumph of innovation
and process-minded strategists could be traced down to the
present day of jet planes and guided missiles.
Emerson looked upon the universe as process, of
democracies evolving out of democracies, of ways of life
growing out of the ways of life. He could look with a clear
eye at the many forms of government that men had devised.
In the United States the form of government was determined
*1
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by a definite necessity which secured to the people of the
country a particular type of democracy. This necessity
determined the form and method of government in accordance
with the peeve's "habit of thought, and no wise transferable
to other states of society. " He did not claim that democracy
was preferable to other forms of government, but more fit for
his day and country. Time and geography entered into the
make-up of any government. Other countries might have
required a monarchy or a council of rulers; but for the
United States of the nineteenth century the proper form of
government and way of life was democrscy. But democracy was
an infinite progression. Therefore, progressive education
of men was necessary to enable them to reach that point in
the process where all men will have achieved harmony with the
moral center. At such a time government would necessarily
disappear, for the wise man needed no government.
In this sense the progressive individualization of
men made lor greater unity rather than for a chaotic
centrifugal individualism. Emerson’s democracy was
centripetal rathan than centrifugal as some people fear.
For all minds would be tuned, so to speak, to the all-
directing and all-directed center.
.• -
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To compensate for his harsh remarks concerning the
citizen body, Emerson hastened to their defense in his
remarks on political parties. He condemned parties as
unprincipled; but the fault rest®not so much on the people as
on their leaders whom they follow in uneasy docility. It is
interesting to note what a modern writer, Aldous Huxley, has
to say about the docility of the people. Emerson’s
"docility” becomes in Huxley’s book the "patience of common
humanity. 11
The patience of common humanity is the most
important, and almost the most surprising,
fact in history. Most men and women are
prepared to tolerate the intolerable. The
reasons for this extraordinary state of things
are many and various. There is ignorance,
first of all. Those who know of no state
of affairs other than the intolerable are
unaware that their lot might be improved.
Then there is fear. Men know that their
life is intolerable, but are afraid of the
consequences of revolt. The existence of a
sense of kinship and social solidarity
constitutes another reason why peonle tolerate
the intolerable. Men and women feel attached
to the society of which they are members — feel
attached even when the rulers of that society
treat them badly. It is worthy of remark that,
in a crisis, the workers (who are ruled) have
always fought for their respective nations
(i.e. for their rulers) and against other
workers. (42)
42. Huxley, Ends and Means, 63,64
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So far as Emerson was concerned there were in
general only "parties of circumstance and not of principle,
"
The parties of circumstance had their hase in local and
personal interests and these interests stood in perpetual
enmity to one another. Agriculture stood against commerce;
capital, against the operator. The extraordinary party of
principle generally had an auspicious beginning; but it
always degenerated into personalities where narrow interests
took hold and contaminated the whole. Religious sects, the
party of free-trade, of universal suffrage, these were
parties of principle. To prevent a party of principle from
degenerating into a party of circumstance Emerson advocated
planting not in local or momentary measures but in "deep
and necessary grounds. " For a moment he focussed his
attention on the existing parties and the best he could say
for them was that one had the best cause, the other had the
best men. Their great common fault lay in the fact that
both parties operated upon the motives of hatred and
selfishness rather than upon the principle of love. To
neither party was he able to turn for any hope of advance-
ment in science, and humanity or art.
But Emerson was hopeful. He could not feel that
the nation was at the "mercy of any waves of chance." He
relied heavily upon the friendly laws of things which would
.'
t
.
*
.
make everything turn out right in the end.
We must trust infinitely to the beneficent ,
necessity which shines through all laws.
Human nature expresses itself in them as
characteristically as in statues or song?, or
railroads, and an abstract of the codes of
nations would be a transcript of the common
conscience. Governments would have their
origin in the moral identity of men. (43)
Ultimately it was the will of the wise man that
determined the law. But since the wise man did not exist in
nature, awkward attempts were made: popular vote, the double
vote, the selection of one person as a leader to set up a
government as he saw fit. In every government devised by
man there was a fragment of an immortal government so that
actual government symbolized an immortal one.
Like millions of men before him and millions more
to come, Emerson strongly objected to taxes as the hardest
of all debts to pay. Neither capitalist nor laborer felt
that ne was receiving his money’s worth; for how could a man
who had never seen Emerson tax him justly? This was one of
the many instances in which one man performed an act which
inevitably bound another. Compelling another to act after
one's own views was a blunder of "colossal ugliness in the
governments of the world." As soon as any person tried to
43 Op. cit., 208
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gain dominion over his fellow, he lived a lie tnat hurt
both parties involved. Therefore, "the less government we
have the better, — the fewer laws, and the less confided
power." This abuse would vanish like a film of mist before
a blazing sun if the real influence of private character
were permitted and the growth of the individual allowed to
go on unchecked. It was the task of nature and of the
state to create the wise man; for the entrance of the wise
man would be the signal for the disappearance of the state
with its armies, and laws and money — unnecessary items.
And love would form the working basis of the political and
economic and social systems. But the influence of character
was in its infancy, and society moved and lived on a
barbaric level. This observation did not crush Emerson or
even seem to make him pause for breath; for he goes on to
suggest that it must advance for "every thought which
genius and piety throw into the world, alters the world."
With characteristic consideration for the dignity
of the Common Man, Emerson, after having extolled the worth
of the wise man, rushed to the rescue of society. He
accused the most religious and the best instructed men of
underestimating society. The initiate did not have
"sufficient belief in the unity of things to persuade them
.*
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that society can be maintained without artificial restraints
as well as the solar system* " They would not or could not
believe that the private citizen might be a good neighbor
unless he was constantly threatened with jail or confisca-
tion. There had never existed in the minds of these few
enough faith in the principle of right and love as
foundations of a state. Emerson was unable to recall a
single man in the history of mankind who had the moral
stamina to oppose a law "on the simple ground of his own
moral nature.” Anyone who dared so act received the taunts
and jibes of scholars and churchmen. Eventually, however,
moral law must triumph; for it was in the nature of things
that it should
..
.
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Emerson's democracy was not merely political in
character but rather embraced all other fields of human
acitivity at once. For example, in his speech entitled
"The American Scholar" he referred to man thinking whose
province extended from the center of his being out to the
rest of the world. The important factor involved was this --
every man was entitled to every resource, be it natural or
man-made, be it tree or earth or sky or law or book, in his
search for perfection. By "every" Emerson meant exactly that.
The student or "scholar" in listening to the address might
easily envisage "every man" to mean student and "scholar"
only. But Emerson meant every living person from bootblack
to true scholar. In effect, this speech was not only a
declaration of American literary independence; but, by virtue
of its giving to the common man every right to which he was
entitled, the rights to enter the domains of art and of culture
and of free private inquiry, Emerson was broadening the base
of democracy.
backward, these rights "tended to be perverted to mere
sectarian and class uses." It was uoon the basis of the
In Emerson’s day and in the centuries extending
flD-r
..
52
restoration of these rights to all men that John Dewey has
called Emerson the "philosopher of democracy." (44) And
Emerson revealed his democratic perspective in essays with
such diverse titles as "The American Scholar," "History",
"The Oversoul" and so on, as well as in the essay that deals
directly with the subject of politics namely, "Politics."
If Emerson stressed the individual and
Individualization, it might be well to remember that the
culture of the eighteenth century apotheosized the state
and counted the individual as nothing. Emerson reacted
against this concept and even, perhaps, overemphasized the
individual by attempting to change the world by development
of the individual alone. Among the factors that matfe for
the self-reliance of the individual in America was the
expanding frontier of the West where individual effort was an
absolute necessity for survival. Living in a revolutionary
and transitional period, he saw a young giant called the
United States grow beyond a seaboard where it was born and
push with vigorous strides westward into a new and exciting
land with infinite and unknown possibilities. Emerson
reacted to it, cooperated with the development and shouted
a very dignified word of cheer to the confident, personal
44. Matthiessen, American Renaissance, 4
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accomplishment of the independent frontiersman. He was
excited by the nation-wide affirmation of freedom of worship,
freedom from political domination by the church and freedom
of business enterprise. He saw a state that tried as much as
possible to follow the principle of less and less government
and hoped eventually lor the disappearance of government
regulation. His doctrine of the infinitude of the private
man made him confident that the equality of all men would be
realized, that the divine spark present in all men would
burst into glorious flame, annulling the need for government;
in this way he created a new world on the basis of individual
achievable perfection.
The frontiersman, however, was not as self-reliant
as -he was pictured. His self-reliance was overemphasized as
was thet of the American of the twentieth century. For his
part the frontiersman relied upon "the government for grants
of land to support his institution and himself. " His tools
and weapons came from the rearguard civilization. The
American of the 1920’s was believed by people the world over
to be at the pinnacle of self-reliance; but the depression
brought out the fact that he was a social creature moving in
a social context. If the social process ceased to function
properly, man found that his very livelihood was endangered.
He soon learned that he was a function of the social movement
•*»
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as it was a function of himself. There was a definite and
real interplay of forces at work. Man was what he was only
because he functioned in a social group. Emerson would have
said that man and society were an integral part of the
totality of nature -- they were nature in one of its infinite
manifestations as matter is a manifestation of energy.
Emerson lived in a generation that reacted violent^ -
against the eighteenth century’s idolatry of the state and
the subjugation of the individual to it. The flexibility of
life in the United States generated by an exploding frontier
and concentrated industrialism necessarily created a supreme
faith in individual initiative. The individual was everything.
This faith took on a characteristic American connotation: a
faith deeper and broader than the first, faith in all men; fcr
belief in one’s self necessitated for the American mind a
belief in all men and in the future of mankind.
Translated into practical politics and economics,
individualism implied laissez-faire or a minimum of government
regulations. But soon after the Civil War it became evident
that narrow sectional and eaonomic interests were to spell
trouble for the principle of laissez-faire. Furthermore the
new concentration of wealth and industrial power put the un -
united working man at the mercy of the masters of the newly
created wealth and power, large and small.
4 i
Democracy had entered a new phase and in so doing
had acquired a new meaning and a new context. Mew methods
and techniques of democratic action were needed. The
individual found that social democracy and economic
democracy and political democracy existed on unequal terms;
and in order to bring about a total democracy he had to unite
them into an integrated smoothly functioning system or way
of life. He was led to the realization of the ideal of a
united social action for a common human purpose. He
discovered that even under a political democracy he could
be the complete slave of a dictatorial employer on the
economic level; or, on the social level, his circle might
be limited to a particular language or racial or income
group. He came up against the paradox of a multitude of
petty despotisms in a somewhat politically democratic
kingdom. The problem had left the domain of pure individua-
lism. The question now became how was an individual’s
independence to be maintained in conjunction with an
ordered security for all?
It was obvious tin t the meanings of such words
as liberty and freedom and equality had to be re-examined;
for while the symbol remained constant; the reality had
changed. Emerson' s suggestion that the meanings of things
be sought in the present applied here. The outmoded
..
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techniques of individualistic politics and economics were
breaking down, and liberty was modified to meet the
broadening base of equality among the masses of the people.
Into the life of the common man there entered a multitude of
social legislation, such as the world had never seen, to
change the configuration of democracy. New questions were
asked. How was the individual to have a more effective and
rich life? How prevent the machine from oppressing the
individual? How make government responsive to the will of
the people? There was to be no waiting lor the arrival
of the wise man, no waiting until the masses be educated
in accordance with Emerson’s dictum. The time was now.
All through this period, democracy was being
subjected to terrific stresses and strains by new inventions
and old techniques, by the growth of cities. Liberty alone
was found to be inadequate to insure equality; and economics
cut a deepening wedge into the political scene. No longer
did man feel that the individual must be freed from society.
Man was society; it grew out of his very being; its values,
out of his heart and brain. Values that men lived under were
socially created. Freedom itself was a value socially
permitted and socially achievable; &nd as a result the
tbnditions for effective freedom were to be brought about
through the cooperative efforts of government and public, of
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public and public and of government and government. Democracy
required that all communities be free.
One of the outstanding spokesman for democracy
today, John Dewey, has emphasized as did Emerson before him,
the experimental approach to social and political problems:
"only through a communication established between groups in
society can shared interests and common goods be determined
and realized. " He relied upon the social group rather than
upon the "unimpeded individual.” (45)
The human end to be realized remained for John
Dewey the development of human personality and the establish-
ment of wide human relationships. Democracy as a way of life
tried to form values that regulated the living of men in a
society. Universal suffrage and periodic elections were
factors in democratic government and were the means that had
been found expedient for realizing democracy as the truly
human way of life. These expedients were not a final value.
Emerson called these things expedients as well, expedients
to serve men's purposes until the wise man arrived.
Dewey suggested that all who were affected by
social institutions have a share in producing and in managing
them. This implied an uncommon faith in the common man.
45. Edman, Fountainheads of Freedom
,
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The democratic faith has emerged very very
recently in the history of mankind. Even
where democracies now exist, men* s minds
and feelings are still permeated with ideas
about leadership imposed from above, ideas
that developed in the long early history of
mankind. After democratic political
institutions were nominally established,
beliefs and ways of looking at life and of
acting that originated when men and women
were externally controlled and subjected to
arbitrary power, persisted in the family, the
church, business and the school, and
experience shows that as long as they persist
there, political democracy is not secure. (46)
Recently public opinion was surveyed over a
period of six consecutive years in as scientific a manner
as it is possible today. The findings were published
nationally.
The American public is far ahead of its
legislators on most matters of legislation.
The public is more willing to make sacrifices
than its leaders suppose.
The farm bloc does not speak for the farmers,
nor labor leaders for labor. Few leaders
have faith in the patriotism of the common
people. The people accepted the principle
of price control of wages and of other aspects
of social and economic existence one year
before Congress gingerly began debating the
Issue.
Continuous studies of public opinion show
that if majority opinion had been acted upon
more often -- or more quickly-- some of the
natioris present headaches might have been
avoided.
Nor is the public infallible. (47)
46. Ibid., 558.
47. Readers’ Digest, 1-3
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While Emerson had little confidence in the people,
yet his philosophy could have adjusted itself to the new
changes in thinking, Emerson's democratic philosophy was
an integral part of the trends and attitudes of the
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, he looked upon natural
and man-made phenomena as processes. He rejected the static
traditionalism and prior authority and therefore stressed
the advancemait of techniques on the basis of living in the
present and the future. He brushed aside the killing
"idolatry of technique" that had spelled death to so many
standardized creatures in the long biological evolution
of life, that had defeated nation after nation addicted to
outmoded methods.
.«
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The modern concept of democracy as an ideal has had
slow and irregular development. Among the ancient Hebrews
and Greeks there existed an elementary form of equality --
an equality restricted to a religious or a national group.
The Hebrews alone were equal before the Law of God. Only
the Greeks belonged to the exclusive city-state family.
The Romans created the concept of universal
quality upon the basis of universal reason which wrote the
man-made code thrugh the medium of a natural law. Their
society was cosmopolitan, requiring only that the individual
recognize correct reason as the foundation of his political
and civil rights. These three ancient systems were
characteristically restrictive either with reference to
groups or to their impact upon the total life of individuals.
The first two systems excluded the non-Hebrew and the non-
Greek worlds while the Roman restricted its activity to the
political and civic fields of life. Concepts of economic and
social equality had not entered into their thinking.
Christianity stressed belief in Christ as the
basis for universal brotherhood. Religious faith was
necessary for the Christian as for the Hebrew. The Middle
Ages combined ancient and medieval ideals into a system of

divinely instituted natural laws of justice. The church was
God’s administrative agent.
The fourteenth century saw first stirrings of
modern liberalism in the words of John Wyclif. He argued
for the individual’s right to his opinion on the basis of
the Scriptures and of reason; and held the tradition of
church and state to be unimportant; their authority,
improper.
It remained for the seventeenth century Levellers,
the first political democrats, to lay the foundations of
modern liberalism in the MAgreement of the People." They
held that laws should insure the safety and well being of
masses of the people. The people were now furthering their
own cause political equality.
The English Civil War period set moving a tremendous
force for liberalism and individualism and swept many English
and Continental philosophers along its stream of action.
Hobbes believed that individual interests were primary and
were best protected by a law and order that prevented men
from preying upon one another. Locke assumed a natural state
in which peace and mutual assistance and natural justice
acted as regulating factors. However, differently these men
fashioned the means, the end was the same: the protection of
personal interests or personal rights. The notions of
individual rights as inherent was becoming a part of men’s-
..
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consciousness. While Hobbes advocated a strong central
government, Locke distrusted too much government.
Individualism found strong supporters in such
Europeans as Rousseau, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley and
Godwin. The founders of the American Republic learned much
of the older English liberalism and placed their faith in
the laws of nature and the individual's access to reason
as the basis for equality. Such phrases as “consent of
the governed, 11 “sovereignty of the people" and “majority
rale" eventually came into daily use in the political field.
Individualism found abundant chance for growth in
a vast unknown continent where established economic and
social castes were absent. It was the esa of Jefferson
and Jackson that brought the idea of the equality of all
citizens and the ideal of the sacred sovereignty of all the
people.
Among other American literary men, Emerson took
up the fight for individualism. Disdaining to write with
logical unity, he opened himself to mis-interpretation by a
world trained in logic. He relied upon the unity of spirit.
Nature was at once a process and a vast symbol of the mind
and as such was not subject to logical treatment. It was to
the Universal Mind that men needed to tumj. for if men
opened their souls to It, their opinions took on the sanctity
of divine origin. The great man was he who was most open to
,,
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receive the truth* When this condition shall have been
reached, then the ultimate or true democracy will have
arrived; and mankind will be united through the medium of
the Universal Mind as a center. Present governments only
detracted from this end. The real function of government
was to train character for the purpose of creating the
_
perfect man.
The basis of Emerson’s equality of all men was
reason. Divine reason was at the root of his democracy;
and the only equality of men rested on this one truth that
all men were capable of living according to the dictates
of reason. Democracy did not mean vanity and loudness. or
lying for gold or for political office; it meant action for
the general good. That the ultimate and true democracy
would materialize Emerson had no doubt. He was conyinced
of the efficacy of the Law of Compensation which refused to
be mismanaged for long. There was a law for politics as
there was a law for chemical reactions and the true democrats
state would come to be just as surely as chemical processes
followed the laws of chemical reaction.
Emerson' s democracy extended out beyond the
political to the economic and social fields as well.
It was the privilege of all men to inquire into every aspect
of life -- of art, of philosophy, of science. For this
..
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reason John Dewey, called him the philosopher of democracy.
If Emerson over- emphasized the individual, he was fighting
against the eighteenth century worship of the state and
rejoiced in the individual accomplishment of the American
frontiersman.
After Emerson, democracy entered a new phase and
acquired a new meaning. Intergration of all of life’s
activities were necessary because of the new industrialism.
Had Emerson been able to see the twentieth century striving
for inter-group activity he would have approved.
Individualistic politics and economics were breaking down.
Liberty alone was inadequate to insure equality; and the
social groups with shared interests replaced the concepts
of the unimpeded individual. The purpose of American
democracy today, still based on the principle of love that
Emerson advocated, is the development of human personality
and the establishment of wider human relationships*
#
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